The authors present a secure facial recognition system. The biometric data are transformed to the cancellable domain using high-order polynomial functions and co-occurrence matrices. The proposed method has provided both high-recognition accuracy and biometric data protection. Protection of data relies on the polynomial functions, where the new reissued cancellable biometric can be obtained by changing the polynomial parameters. Besides the protection of data, the reconstructed co-occurrence matrices also contributed to the accuracy enhancement. Hadamard product is used to reconstruct the new measure and has shown high flexibility in proving a new relationship between two independent covariance matrices. The proposed cancellable biometric is treated in the same manner as the original biometric data, which enables replacement of original data by the novel cancellable algorithm with no change to the authentication system. The two-dimensional principal component analysis recognition algorithm is used at the authentication stage. Results have shown high non-reversibility of data with improved accuracy over the original data and raised the performance recognition rate to 97%.
Introduction
A biometric authentication system refers to an identity management system in which some unique features of the human body are used as a means of identity. These features, such as face, fingerprint, iris, retina, hand to name a few, must fulfil a certain criteria to qualify for use in identification. In addition to being unique, they must also be permanent over the lifetime, universal, acceptable, collectable and most importantly suitable for high and accurate identification performance. Although permanence of biometrics is a key feature that guarantees reliability and uniqueness of data over the required period of time, there are other challenges and risks that biometrics face. If biometric data are illegally obtained, for example, compromised from a database by unauthorised users, the genuine owner will lose control over them forever and lose his/her identity. Relatively, recent research has turned its attention to the protection of biometric data more seriously. Cancellable biometric is a way in which to inherit the protection and the replacement features into biometrics. It was first proposed by Ratha et al. [1] . Besides reliable accuracy performance and the replacement policy cancellable biometric have to be non-reversible in order to fulfil the aim of enabling biometrics to replace traditional authentication methods.
In this work, we present a novel secure biometric system, which generates an endless number of secure cancellable facial biometric templates from the same original biometric. This is achieved by using the co-occurrence matrices of the face and a high-order polynomial function which results in a one-way mapping.
Many attempts to protect biometrics have been developed. Monrose et al. [2] presented a hardening password scheme based on the examination of keystroke duration and latency between keystrokes. A random polynomial function was used for computational hardness. The method was later extended to voice biometrics [3] . The fuzzy commitment scheme [4] and the fuzzy vault scheme [5] were proposed to protect biometrics cryptographically by a committed value that is infeasible for an attacker to learn. Testing witness that acts as a decrypting key can be sufficiently close to the original committer witness to de-commit the data in a one single way, however, not essentially identical. Neither of the methods dealt with practical employment and more importantly the reusability. Later, the fuzzy vault scheme was implemented on fingerprint biometrics [6] in which a polynomial-based scheme was used to generate binding pairs from a collection of extracted fingerprint minutia points and chaff points. The scheme was evaluated at 20-30% false rejection rate without the alignment of fingerprint features in the fuzzy vault domain, which was later dealt with by Chung et al. [7] . The alignment was achieved using a geometrical hashing-based technique.
All these previous techniques are based on cryptosystems, where biometric data is used as a 'key' to bind or produce identification codes that are used for authentication. Despite the high confidence of these identification codes, they do not consider the reusability of biometrics when codes are compromised. They also suffer from tolerance which is inherent in biometric data. This can be sufficiently detrimental to the accuracy performance which in turn produces higher false rejection rates. In addition, as the attention in these systems turns towards improved identification codes and in terms of the metrics security and accuracy, biometrics does not gain sufficient protection although identification codes are replaceable but biometrics is not.
Several methods for generating cancellable biometrics have been proposed. The main idea behind cancellable biometrics is to transform the original data to a certain domain, where recognition can be accurately performed and cannot be transformed back to the original data. Ratha et al. [1] and Bolle et al. [8] define the cancellable biometric as intentional repeatable distortion of a biometric signal based on chosen transforms. The distortion is repeated in the same fashion during enrolment and for every subsequent authentication. The distortion was achieved by morphing, where a regular point pattern or grid, that is, overlaid on the image after transforming the face image into a canonical position, for example, by aligning the intra-eye segments. The FaceHash was developed using the wavelet FourierMellin transform for facial feature extraction and a tokenised pseudo-random code generator to create the cancellable template [9] . Savvides et al. [10] generate cancellable biometric by encrypting a training set of images to construct a minimum average correlation energy filter for face authentication. The filter is convolved with the original biometric to produce the cancellable template. An adaptive non-uniform quantisation [11] algorithm was also introduced to protect biometric templates. The algorithm constructs a quantised vector from the biometric data and stores it or uses it for identification by its hash. The biometrics is quantised using a quantisation template, that is, stored with the hashing values generated from the quantised biometric features. Zeng et al. [12] presented a secured biometric key using lattice mapping. The biometric feature vector is mapped in the lattice space using a certain codeword. The only information that is stored in the system is the lattice function that is used with the testing biometric vector to de-commit the encrypted codeword which is then used as a key or identification code. Sutcu et al. [13] proposed a biometrics protection method using the so-called secure sketch for biometric template protection. The extracted biometric feature vector is quantised according to a certain quantisation space before the sketch scheme is employed to generate the sketch string, which is then used for hashing in a similar manner as the fuzzy commitment scheme [4] . Recently, another cancellable biometric approach [14] has been presented as a method to protect facial biometric through the usage of co-occurrence matrices and high-order polynomial mapping. In this work, image-based recognition approaches, such as principal component analysis (PCA) [15] and Fisher discriminant analysis (FDA) [16] , were considered for verification purposes because of the high quality of information that resides in the holistic representation such as lines, shading, surface based, global metric etc. which normally result in a better recognition performance [17 -20] .
The paper presents and explains our cancellable biometric method in Section 2 with a comprehensive mathematical analysis. The results are provided and discussed therein detail in Section 3. Our final conclusion and comments are given in Section 4.
2 Co-occurrence and polynomial mapping
Cancellable face biometric
Original biometric such as face, fingerprint or iris cannot be cancelled or replaced by another one. However, making the biometric data cancellable puts many restrictions in terms of performance accuracy and recognition, which limits the possibilities of successful transformations.
The reasoning behind cancellable biometric is that it provides the possibility to cancel the templates of the biometric that is used for authentication when they are compromised, (Fig. 1) . The original biometric data are only required when a completely new cancellable template is generated, or when the existing template has been compromised. The rest of the authentication procedure is conducted on the cancellable templates, hence keeping the original data from being exposed during the processing. As shown in Fig. 1 , the reissuing of new templates is simply achieved by selecting different sets of parameters for the polynomial function. From the original biometric, a high number of cancellable biometric templates can be generated, which significantly reduces the limitation on the number of unique biometric features of the human body. recognition engines have been intensively used and well established. A significant improvement was achieved when the eigenfaces method was proposed [15] . It improved accuracy, efficiency and give good performance under difficult acquisition conditions specially the two-dimensional-based PCA (2DPCA) methods, such as 2DPCA [21] and twodimensional reduction PCA (2DRPCA) [22] .
The cancellable transformation is established in several stages shown in Fig. 2 . First, the co-occurrence matrix is computed from the original face image. Then the original face image is passed through a nonlinear transformation, which involves the high-order polynomial computation. The computed co occurrence matrix is then used to extract the non-zero co-occurrence vector, which will construct the new co occurrence matrix that is multiplied by the transformed image using the Hadamard product. The reason for combining these two stages is to reduce the correlation of the data samples and introduce outliers, which enlarge the recognition space in the face recognition system, hence better discrimination and separation between classes are obtained which leads to higher recognition rates. The Hadamard product is an element-wise multiplication of vectors and matrices, which provides a good flexibility in the product term and establishes an important relationship within the cancellable biometric data by joining the covariance co-occurrence matrix with the polynomially transformed facial image.
When someone enrols on the recognition system, the transformation algorithm will generate two outputs, one is the cancellable biometric itself, and the other one is the parameters used to generate this cancellable template, (Fig. 3 ). The parameters of the transformation are preserved for further enrolment or recognition processes and the cancellable template will be stored in the system's database as a normal biometric. During the enrolment of different face images of the same person, only one unique set of transformation's parameters is used.
The recognition stage as shown in Fig. 4 is started when a face image of the subject is captured and fed into the system with the transformation parameters that were used on enrolment. A cancellable template will be generated from the transformation algorithm and forwarded to the 2DPCA algorithm.
Co-occurrence matrices
The use of the co-occurrence matrices [23] is needed to represent the image in terms of the relationship of the pixels. Co-occurrence matrices are derived from the grey levels of the image. It is a second-order statistic that measures the relationships of grey levels in the image by indicating the joint probability of them at a certain displacement (distance and orientation) in the image [24, 25] Figure 2 Procedure of producing the cancellable transformed image where I (u,v) is the intensity value of the image I at location (u, v), Dx and Dy are the offset parameters of the x and y dimensions of the displacement vector, which is also called the position operator. i and j are the indexes of the grey levels. However, the co-occurrence matrix is multiplied by the total number of pixel parings in the matrix; hence, it is not a presentation of probability anymore. Using the formula of the co-occurrence matrix (1), a square matrix of L Â L is computed, where L is the number of grey levels. From this square matrix, the non-zero values are extracted as a form of vector. This non-zero co-occurrence vector is then used to reconstruct an M Â N matrix, where M and N are the original image dimensions. If the non-zero vector happens to be smaller than the matrix of the image dimensions, a repeated pattern of the vector is used to fill the rest of the matrix. The produced matrix is the reconstructed co-occurrence matrix that is used later at different stages.
Polynomial transformation
To protect the biometric information, the cancellable version of the biometric has to be transformed so that it is not reversible. One-way transformation is an open problem in mathematics, where
exists. The concept of a biometric feature is to use the human body distinctive characteristic instead of traditional password and identification numbers without any PIN or passwords for the users, which puts forward extra challenges. There are different types of one-way functions and they can be classified as strong one-way functions, weak one-way functions, nonuniformly one-way functions and plau-side candidates for such functions [26] . These functions can be easily computed but are difficult to invert. Hence, if x is an input to a one-way function f ( . ), the output y is computed in a polynomial-time algorithm. On the other hand, the one-way function is difficult to invert in that any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm could succeed to compute x when y is given with a negligible probability [26] . One-way functions can be used and manipulated to achieve our aim of non-reversibility, where adjustment and modification of functions are specified by the nature of the transformation procedure.
Using a polynomial function introduces new coordinates of the image pixels. Polynomial functions of high order that are one-way functions are hard to invert in polynomial-time algorithm when the input is of a large sequence. Let f ( . ) denote an n-order polynomial function and X is the input sequence that presents the coordinates of the original image. Coordinate Y that represents the transformed image will be generated by the polynomial. Each pixel coordinate of the image is transferred to another coordinate through the polynomial function. This transformation aims to relocate the pixels of the image in a nonlinear sense such that they cannot be reversed to their original coordinates. This transformation will not change the intensity values of the pixels themselves, which will retain the recognition accuracy using the image-based approaches, such as 2DPCA [21] . The transformed images do not resemble any facial characteristics at all; in fact, they appear as random data. Polynomial function used for transformation has a certain number of parameters. These parameters determine the new transformation characteristics
Reversing the transformed value of f (x) will generate more than a single x value. The worst-case scenario in terms of lowest security for f (x) is when it has only two reversed values for each computed x. If f (x) is considered as a pixel in the transformed image and both the polynomial function and the transformed image are available, the possibility to reverse the transformed image to its original form is computed as follows.
According to the worst-case scenario, that is, with the lowest security, there are two possible values of each transformed sample
The image has a matrix size M Â N. For simplification, the image is vectorised into one vector that has M Â N dimensions
where X is the original image and x i (i ¼ 1, 2, 3, . . . , M Â N ) are the samples of this image. Hence
where C is the transformed image in the cancellable domain.
From (3), the worst-case scenario, the possibility for each f (x) is two. Hence the probability of occurrence is
Since for the worst-case scenario P( f (x)) ¼ 0.5, it follows that P (C) ¼ 0.5 MÂN is the joint probability where M Â N is usually a very large number (in the order of thousands).
To extend this solution, let us assume that the number of reversing possibilities of each f (x) is k 
It is very clear from the final solution that P (C ) is very small, which contributes to a very high non-reversibility especially if there are more than two possible inverse values for each x.
Two-dimensional PCA
There are three main points in the recognition performance of the cancellable biometric, and they affect each other. First, recognition should be conducted in the cancellable domain therefore the domain has to be suitable for accurate recognition performance. In order to maintain this criterion, the transformed data must have a unique identity, which means no overlapping between different identities in the transformed domain. Hence, each original biometrical identity has only one corresponding identity in the defined cancellable domain, that is, if we consider that each domain is a set, according to the set theory, there is a bijective relationship between both. However, this does not mean that identities in the cancellable domain can be used to obtain the biometric data in the original domain; they only refer to the original identity. Conducting the recognition in the cancellable domain is the major concept of security in the entire system. It protects the biometric data at every stage of the recognition process and if any of the cancellable templates are compromised, it can be simply discarded and a new one is issued.
The 2DPCA is an extended version of the conventional PCA [15] . It operates on matrices instead of a vector in PCA. In conventional PCA, each M Â N face image is converted into one vector, that is, vectorised, and has M Â N dimensions, before performing any analysis on the multivariate data. The covariance matrix is computed for the dimensions of the vectors. However, in the case of 2DPCA this is different -each image is considered as a set of column vectors, N vectors, each one is M dimensions. Therefore the covariance matrix is computed for the columns in the image. The following algorithm is a summary of the 2DPCA and further information can be found in [21] . This brief summary will be used later to describe the effect of the cancellable biometric data on the recognition performance.
Consider the projection y ¼ Gu, where y is the projected vector, u the unitary column vector and G the image. To determine a good projection vector u, Tr(u) has to be maximised, which is the total scatter trace of the covariance matrix S y , Tr(u) ¼ trace(S y ). The covariance is computed by
where E[ . ] is the expected value. The total scatter trace is
Hence, the generalised scatter criterion
where
Here, u that maximises Tr(u) is called the optimal projection axis, u opt . This means that the total scatter of the projected samples is maximised when it is projected onto u opt , which is the eigenvector of the covariance S G . However, one eigenvector is not enough and therefore a set of orthogonal axes are selected
The orthogonal constraints are given by
where d is the largest eigenvalue. Then
where y is the principal component (PC) vector, which is a scalar in conventional PCA, and F the extracted features after the projection. The distance between two feature matrices is computed by the Euclidean distance, denoted
Therefore for the test sample Let C denote the cancellable biometric face, Q the reconstructed co-occurrence matrix and P the nonlinearly transformed face as shown below
where both matrices Q and P have the same dimensions M Â N and '8' is the Hadamard product. Given the covariance matrix for the cancellable template S C , it follows that
Expanding (24) results in the following presentation
where S P and S Q are the covariance matrices of the polynomially transformed images, P, and the reconstructed co-occurrence matrices, Q, respectively.
The covariance matrix of the cancellable biometric (27) consists of the covariance matrices of the transformed face images and the co-occurrence matrices that are multiplied together using the Hadamard product. This relates the variations over the face images with the variations over the co-occurrence matrices with each other. Dividing the covariance matrix, S C , by the total energy distribution of the transformed images and the co-occurrence matrices, will give the correlation matrix of the cancellable biometric, which clearly indicates the joint probability of each transformed face image with its corresponding co-occurrence matrix. Provided that each face image has a different co-occurrence, the certainty of different faces to vary with each other reduces, whereas the certainty indeed increases for similar faces of the same person. This condition has put more restrictions on the face classification, since the decision now depends upon the joint probability of two different measures for the same subject, which makes the decision more robust and less misleading.
In addition, the presence of the polynomial function within the covariance matrix via the transformed image makes the accuracy dependent to some extent on the polynomial transformation characteristics. Note that the co-occurrence matrix is computed for the original face image G before the non linear transformation f ( . ).
The covariance image matrix of P tries to find the relationships of the columns within the image itself. In the normal case, where G is not non linearly transformed, adjacent columns should have higher relationship because of the small variation across the human face from one column to another. However, the nonlinear transformation restricts the relationship of the columns to itself only. This contributes to diagonalising the covariance matrix of the cancellable biometric and concentrates the energy along the diagonal of S C . On the other hand, each P matrix has its own Q matrix which is attached to it and differs from others. Hence, the discrimination and the recognition of the face relay on the relationships between the transformed faces and the co-occurrence matrices that are varying from one set to another.
For classification, let Z denotes the extracted features of the cancellable biometric face
variations in P. Note that it does not relate Q to P or visa versa.
Here,
are two large vectors in the Hilbert space, and Q (i) and Q ( j ) are two different vectors that have the same dimensions in the Hilbert space. The probability of convergence of the two vectors to the exact same magnitude and angle, that is, same point in the Hilbert space, if they are multiplied, using the Hadamard product, by the two other vectors Q (i) and Q ( j ) is very small in comparison with the probability of being different.
Let P (u) be the probability of having the same angle, and P (M ) be the probability of having the same magnitude. The probability of both vectors to converge to the same point is P (u)P (M ).
Cleary, P(M ) is very small and the probability P (E) is even smaller when multiplied by P(u) to verify the condition of having the same angle and magnitude.
Results and discussion
The experiments were conducted on the Olivetti Research Ltd (ORL) database. The ORL facial database [27] has 400 images for 40 individuals, 10 images each. The ages of individuals vary between 18 and 81, whereas the majority is between 20 and 35. Images were captured under no constraints on expressions but with limited side movement tolerated tilt. The acquisition of most individuals occurred under time variant, different lighting conditions and against dark homogeneous background. All individuals were in an upright frontal position some have been photographed with or without glasses. Images were manually cropped, re-sampled to 112 Â 92 pixels and stored in eight bits grey-level PGM formatted image files.
The cancellable templates have been generated to replace the original images in all the process stages, including the recognition. This means that the templates will not be decoded to their original form at verification, which will provide protection to the biometric along all the processing chain. Therefore the cancellable templates mimic the original facial images in their format and size. Also used in exactly the same fashion is the recognition algorithm which is not adapted to the changes of the images and regards the cancellable templates as the original images. Hence, the cancellable templates are transformable in-between a number of facial recognition algorithms that use the statistical (or image-based) classification approach.
Samples of these images are shown in Fig. 5a . The first five images are used for training the algorithm and the rest are used to evaluate the algorithm. Our cancellable biometric images are shown in Fig. 5b . It is notable that the cancellable templates do not carry any visual information such as shape of a face or anything else. In fact, they resemble a matrix of random sequences rather than images. This protects the templates from being reversed transformed on some previously known visual features of the individual face, either manually or automatically, which might be possible with morphed images [1, 8] . This enables the images to be treated as a cipher text and as 24917 , which is extremely small. This negligible probability indicates the success of a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm to invert the transformed images, which means very high non-reversibility.
The comparison of the recognition accuracy curves of the original, the morphed [8] and the proposed cancellable biometric data show a significant increase in performance in recognition rates enhanced by the proposed method, (Fig. 6) . The 2DPCA recognition algorithm has been used without being changed; the only change was conducted on the input facial images.
The highest accuracy for the cancellable data is 97% in contrast to 93% for the original data and 91.5% for the morphed images. Remarkably, our cancellable biometric method has increased both the security and accuracy, whereas in other cancellable biometric algorithm, such as the morphed images [1] , accuracy rate of the recognition has been reduced. In addition, the highest accuracy is achieved at a smaller number of PCs than the one achieved for both the original and the morphed images. This reduces the memory requirements to handle the extracted features and hence reduces the complexity of the feature projection and the computation of the Euclidean distance. The improvement of the recognition accuracy is stated more clearly in Fig. 7 . Our cancellable biometric has achieved high improvement over both the original and the morphed images; however, the improvement is even greater over the morphed images.
Concentrating on the original data, the maximum accuracy improvement (5%) has been reached at the 5th, 14th -17th PC vectors for recognition, and for the morphed images, the recognition accuracy rate has reached maximum 7.5% at the first PC.
To further examine the method, a comparison between the original and the proposed cancellable biometric is carried out based on the training samples. Table 1 shows the top recognition accuracy rates at different numbers of training samples. As observed, the recognition accuracy improves as much as 4% over the original face images. This is obtained at five training samples per class. The overall Figure 7 Improvement of recognition accuracy rates up to the 20th PC for our cancellable biometric over the original and the morphed images recognition performance changes with the number of training samples (Fig. 8) . As expected, all recognition curves have improved when the training samples were increased except of the fourth sample set that has an overlap with the third curve. Fig. 9 shows a logarithmic plot of the eigenvalues of both the original and cancellable data in descending order. In general, the eigenvalues of the cancellable data are higher than the eigenvalues of the original data, which means that their corresponding eigenvectors accumulating more variations along their projection directions. This is due to the cancellable transformation that relocates the data in a random sense, which reduces the correlation of the image columns with their neighbouring columns, and hence reduces the variance of these columns with each other in the covariance matrix that leads to a better distribution or scattering of the observations and reduces the common components. This enables the eigenvectors to project more distinctive information that helps in improving the accuracy.
Finally, Table 2 shows general comparisons of our cancellable biometric with other cancellable methods. Our cancellable biometric is not visible, that is, could not be seen visually, which shields it from shape modifications and being transformed to the original face; it does not require the user to remember a PIN number, and it can be used with different image-based recognition methods and maintain a high security with improved recognition accuracy.
Conclusion
Biometric authentication cannot replace the traditional authentication system without trusted security for biometric data. An improved accuracy and secure cancellable biometric has been proposed. The proposed cancellable biometric data are handled for recognition purposes in the same fashion as the original data. They are used for imagebased recognition methods with no changes to the authentication algorithm. Each of them represents a unique identity; however, the original biometric cannot be obtained from the transformed cancellable data. In case the transformed data are compromised, which has no influence on the original data, a new transformed data can be issued from the original biometric by defining different parameters of the polynomial function. Security of biometric data is obtained by the polynomial function together with the reconstructed co-occurrence matrices. The generated cancellable templates do not contain any visual information about the face and can be considered as a cipher text. The probability of breaking the template with brute force attack, given that the transformation parameters and function are available, is 5.53 24917 when k ¼ 3. It has also been proven and analysed that there are some distinct relationships of Figure 8 Varying recognition accuracy curves with the number of training samples per facial class [9] no no no high 
